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When Dieudonné M’bala M’bala had his 
antisemitic comedy show banned by a French 
court in 2014, he explained this decision by 
alleging (inaccurately) that the judge was a 
great nephew of Alfred Dreyfus himself. The 
name still resonates with antisemitic power and 
it connotes the unpatriotic and scheming Jew.
Dieudonné is a most contemporary French 
antisemite. His Holocaust denial and the way 
he ridicules those who oppose antisemitism take 
ostensibly pro-Palestinian and anti-imperialist 
forms. His antisemitism inhabits the space where 
left and right conspiracy fantasies become indis-
tinguishable. His “quenelle,” a kind of stilted, 
censored, Nazi salute, is a performance jibe, 
articulating the notion that that the French 
establishment, at the behest of the Jews, silences 
all criticism with a false accusation of antisemi-
tism. Every accusation of antisemitism, he teases, 
is in reality a mobilization of Jewish power.
Dieudonné’s show, for which he had sold 
6,000 tickets, was the first in a twenty-two-date 
tour of France. It was banned by a higher court 
in Nantes. French Interior Minister Manuel 
Valls had spoken against the tour and it was 
held by the court to constitute a threat to public 
order. And in response, Dieudonné invoked the 
magic word, “Dreyfus.”
In her huge 1951 book Origins of Totalitar­
ianism, Hannah Arendt articulated her rage 
against a world in which the Final Solution and 
the Gulag could exist. She was furious with every-
body: the left, the right, the philosophers, the prag-
matists, the ideologues, the Nazis, the Stalinists, 
the liberals, the imperialists, and even the Jewish 
leaders. Perhaps, to the degree that she herself may 
have fitted in to more than one of these categories, 
she was also furious with herself for having been 
unable to prevent the victories of continent-sized 
movements, organized on the basis of terror and 
on the industrialization of murder. These were 
not only movements which perpetrated crimes 
against flesh and blood human beings, but crimes 
which, taken together, also constituted a criminal 
assault on the common notion of humanity itself, 
and therefore on human civilization as such.
And some of Arendt’s furious powerlessness, 
expressed in forensic and scholarly dissection of 
the events and the ways of thinking which led 
towards totalitarianism, may also be explained 
by the certainty that similar things would 
happen again and that we would be powerless, 
again, to stop them. In this hindsight excava-
tion of what had gone wrong, of what led to 
Nazism and to Stalinism, Arendt devotes a 
whole chapter to the so-called “Dreyfus affair.” 
Strange to call it an “affair.” A “sequence of 
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events of a specified kind or that has previously 
been referred to.” To call it an affair is already 
to discuss not the thing itself but the ways in 
which the thing itself has been bundled up into 
narratives and ready-made packets of think-
ing, each saturated with emotional power and 
commitment. And then, is there not something 
inescapably absurd or perhaps necessarily trivial 
about an affair? 
Robert Wistrich, a driven historian and 
opponent of antisemitism, wrote this piece about 
the Dreyfus affair in 2014 and he died prema-
turely and suddenly in 2015; much missed by 
friends, colleagues. and a wider public. Already 
the 2019 world in which this piece is being pub-
lished would be in some ways unrecognizable to 
the author. In 2014 the only references to the 
Trump presidency were facetious, dystopian 
humor in Back to the Future and The Simpsons. 
“Euroscepticism” was still an earnest and dusty 
eccentricity in Britain, on the nostalgic Tory 
right and on the Stalinist-nationalist left. Steve 
Bannon, Matteo Salvini, Nigel Farage, and 
Jeremy Corbyn were eccentric figures, little 
known, working away in their fringe spaces. 
Their fantasies of mainstream power were taken 
seriously by nobody but themselves and perhaps 
by their own circles of cronies. 
But Robert Wistrich did understand left 
and socialist antisemitism, he did fear it, and 
he did prophesy its rise. In 2012 he published 
his last major work on it—From Ambivalence 
to Betrayal: the Left, the Jews, and Israel.1 Yet 
perhaps he might still have been dismayed if he 
knew how right he had been and how quickly, 
not least in the UK, the country from which he 
made Aliya to Israel.
We read history in the present. We are think-
ing about the Dreyfus affair today, at a moment 
when many of the characteristics which Arendt 
identified as defining totalitarian movements 
are becoming more and more apparent in 
political life, and in the life of public discourse 
more generally. And Hannah Arendt saw in the 
Dreyfus affair a number of the elements which 
were later to come together in totalitarianism.
Perhaps the most striking thing about the 
Dreyfus affair in relation to the rise of con-
temporary populism is its symbolic nature. For 
Dreyfus, of course, what happened to him was 
not symbolic, it was not “an affair”: it was his 
own catastrophe. He was a good army officer; 
a modernizer and a meritocrat, an honorable 
and courageous soldier. The fake accusation 
of betrayal made against him was in fact a real 
betrayal of him, by people who he thought were 
his peers, his fellow officers ,and his comrades; 
he thought he was one of them, or that he could 
be one of them.
The experience is of being pushed out of 
social spaces in which one feels at home and 
of being made socially homeless before being 
made actually homeless; of losing one’s friends 
before losing one’s citizenship; of losing the 
respect of one’s peers. While we still cannot 
quite believe that this is happening to us, while 
we still wonder if we ourselves are simply imag-
ining the surging and dimming of the gaslight, 
this is the experience of many Jews today.
I have recently seen younger Labour activ-
ists say that if they had been told five years ago 
that Labour antisemitism would have been so 
explicit and ubiquitous as to make them feel 
driven out of the party they would have been 
shocked. But five years ago, many of us had 
already been through all this in the University 
and College Union (UCU), and we’d been 
writing about it for the previous eight years—as 
loudly and as persistently as we possibly could. 
The Fraser trial was in 2012. When all the 
evidence from UCU was presented, we were 
told by the judges that we had invented all the 
antisemitism in order to gain a sneaky advan-
tage in the Israel/Palestine debate.
I don’t blame them (the young activists, 
I mean; I do blame the judges in the Fraser 
trial). I suspect people simply can’t believe the 
significance of antisemitism, or understand 
it, until they have felt it themselves. Which is 
why so many good people look at the evidence, 
accounts, and explanations with dead eyes; and 
make a judgement that it’s overblown or not 
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significant compared to other things; or think 
it is part of a conspiracy to silence criticism of 
Israel; or that it is “weaponized”; or Jews that 
are privileged.
I was quite shocked when I first saw it in 
1985 in the student movement; and I was very 
shocked again when I first experienced it as an 
adult on campus in 2004.
And Jewish feminists were quite shocked 
when they were driven out of the Spare Rib col-
lective in the late 70s because they declined a 
polite invitation to disavow “Zionism.” 
And Jewish Czech communists were quite 
shocked when they were hanged in 1951, at the 
time of the Slansky trial.
And Alfred Dreyfus was quite shocked when 
he was falsely tried by his fellow officers and was 
sent to Devil’s Island.
And Karl Marx was quite shocked when 
Bruno Bauer told him that Jews could only be 
emancipated in Germany on condition that 
they first emancipate themselves from their bar-
baric religion.
The proto-totalitarian nature of turn of the 
century France was clearer, more explicit, and 
better developed than we see across the world 
today; the mob was closer at hand and its vio-
lence was more immediately threatening. But 
then, on the other hand, there was not yet the 
experience of totalitarianism, drawn in stark 
images on the wall, to show people precisely 
what they should fear; or what they should 
ridicule others for fearing. When Zola stood 
up for Dreyfus, the mob literally came to his 
house and smashed his windows and later he 
was imprisoned. When academics stood up for 
Dreyfus, their university rooms were trashed 
by the mob. The police and the state could not 
be relied upon to defend one from crowds of 
antisemites. A Twitter dogpile is not the same 
as a mob trying to kill you. Yet still, there are 
clear parallels between that world and our own.
Theodor Herzl, later celebrated, and demon-
ized, as a key founder of the Zionist movement, 
witnessed the publicly staged humiliation of 
Alfred Dreyfus. He was  present at the expulsion 
of Dreyfus from the  community to which he 
thought he belonged, the explicitly ceremonial 
stripping of his epaulettes, and the breaking of 
his sword. He witnessed the figurative throw-
ing of Dreyfus by the elite to the mob; liter-
ally a baying, Jew-hating mob. For Herzl this 
scene was illustrative of the necessity for Jewish 
national self-determination and of the danger 
of Jews relying on the democratic republic to 
guarantee their safety. Dreyfus was taken to 
Devil’s Island and his guards were instructed 
not even to talk to him such that he began to 
forget how to talk. And the Jewish man endured 
the explicit daily humiliation of being forced to 
exist on a diet of rotting pork.
Hannah Arendt ends her chapter on Dreyfus 
with the following observation, which may sur-
prise some on both the left and the right who 
mistakenly read Arendt as an antizionist: 
Thus closes the only episode in which the 
subterranean forces of the nineteenth century 
enter the full light of recorded history. The 
only visible result was that it gave birth to the 
Zionist movement—the only political answer 
Jews have ever found to antisemitism and the 
only ideology in which they have ever taken 
seriously a hostility that would place them in 
the center of world events.2
Yet if his story is not symbolic for Dreyfus him-
self, but concrete, it comes to appear symbolic 
for everybody else. Robert Wistrich quotes 
Maurice Barres, an “anti-Dreyfusard” in 1898: 
“That Dreyfus is guilty, I conclude from his 
race.” We learn from this that Barres had no 
idea at all if Dreyfus was actually guilty or not 
and that it was of no importance to him. For 
him, Dreyfus’s guilt was a symbolic and moral 
certainty, not a material question. It was an 
issue which separated the good people in France 
from those who were said to threaten their way 
of life. The suffering of one man on Devil’s 
Island is not, in this way of thinking, significant 
when put in the balance against the survival of 
the nation.
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When the crime against Dreyfus was trans-
formed into an “affair” it became a language with 
which to fight culture wars, a way of perform-
ing one’s own identity. Dreyfus became the raw 
material for the sharing of meanings about what it 
meant to be French, what it meant to be patriotic, 
and what it meant to be loyal to the republic.
But the concrete events were not randomly 
constructed as “the Dreyfus affair.” Antisemitism 
begins with a concept of its own creation, “the 
Jews,” and it shapes reality to fit this fantasy. 
Antisemitism, created by people who feel power-
less, is a fantasy about powerless people running 
the world. The Jewish monolith invented by the 
antisemites is then mapped onto the bodies of 
actual Jewish men, women, and children. The 
plausibility of antisemitism, or its implausibility, 
is conditioned by the ways in which the diversity 
of Jewish human beings is made to appear iden-
tical to the mythical “the Jews.”
Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister of 
Malaysia, said recently at the Cambridge Union 
that he “had some Jewish friends, very good 
friends. They are not like the other Jews, that’s 
why they are my friends.”3 Himmler himself 
famously commiserated with himself that ‘ . . . . 
all the 80 million upright Germans, and each 
one has his decent Jew. They say: all the others 
are swine, but here is a first-class Jew.”4
It is both true that Dreyfus was a man and 
that the “Dreyfus affair” was about competing 
narratives relating to French identity, betrayal, 
and the republic. The meat was both pork and 
it was also rotting. The issue was the suffering 
of one man but the issue was also the meaning 
of democracy. 
The Dreyfus affair was not randomly con-
structed, it was constructed by antisemitism. 
Antisemitism portrayed the particular Jewish 
man only as a tentacle of “the Jews” and not at 
all as a man with interests of his own, agency, or 
reason. And it thereby framed the discussion. 
Alfred Dreyfus was hated by his fellow officers 
as a modernizer, as a supporter of a new merito-
cratic ethos in the army, and then as “not one of 
us,” and then as a Jew.
Many scholars today do not hyphenate the 
word “antisemitism.” They want to indicate that 
the “semitism” to which antisemitism is opposed 
is not something found in the world but that 
it is invented by the antisemites themselves. 
Some scholars are now dropping the hyphen in 
antizionism for the same reason. The “Zionism” 
in opposition to which antizionism defines itself 
is similarly self-constructed; it is a “Zionism” 
which means racism, imperialism, apartheid, 
and Nazism. Antisemitism has always put the 
Jews at the center of all that is bad in the world, 
and it made the Jews symbolic of what was bad 
in the world. Antizionism puts Israel at the 
center of all that is bad in the world—the block 
to peace across the whole region, the demonic 
developer and inventor of technologies of sur-
veillance and securitization, and symbolic of the 
global domination of “whiteness.”
Jews are cast out of “whiteness” by white 
supremacists, and they are more and more cast 
out of the resistance to white supremacists by 
being themselves designated as “white,” and 
then, in a vile inversion, as “white suprema-
cists”; a double bind which becomes farcical 
when it is remembered that half of the Jews of 
Israel could not pass as “white” in any sense that 
any racist would recognize. But the Israel which 
the antizionists hate, the mythical Israel, the 
Israel which constitutes the raw material for our 
own performances of identity, bears only the 
most superficial resemblance to the Israel which 
exists in all its material complexity and human 
contradiction. 
Dreyfus was cast as the Jew, from the outside 
and independently of his own self-consciousness, 
an indivisible atom or cell of “the Jews.” In 
our day, antizionism casts Jews in general as 
representatives of Zionism, even if it allows in 
principle for exceptional good Jews to be 
absolved. The diverse and plural identities of 
Palestinian men and women are appropriated, 
unified, and redrawn as universal symbols of 
the oppressed. It may be true that the construc-
tion of “the Palestinians” as the symbolic and 
universal victim thereby constructs “the Israelis” 
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as symbolic of oppression everywhere. But this 
must itself already be a reversal. The Palestinians 
become universally symbolic because of their 
relationship with the Jews, who have a long 
history of being constructed as universally 
symbolic of all that is evil. Jewish crimes come 
before Palestinian victimhood in this symbolic 
register; the Palestinians simply get caught up in 
it and they get hurt by it.
The charges against Dreyfus were treated 
as though they were unfalsifiable. When some 
of the evidence was indeed found to have been 
falsified, it was proposed that there was other 
evidence which could not be made public, for 
the good of the nation. When evidence was pro-
duced against the real spy, it was said to have 
been manufactured by the Jewish conspiracy 
and even if it was true, it was held not to exon-
erate Dreyfus. And when one of the actual con-
spirators was imprisoned, the antisemites rallied 
round his innocent wife and his innocent child, 
they gave money, and they raged against the 
Jews who make the innocent suffer.
The Dreyfusards cared about republic; some 
of them cared about Dreyfus too. Antisemitism is 
about Jews but it is also always a form of appear-
ance of antidemocratic politics, a symptom of 
profound corruption in any social space where it 
is tolerated. The two so often seem to be insepa-
rable, the threat to actual Jews, and the corrosion 
of civic and democratic thought and practice.
If one wants to defend the democratic state, 
then it is clear that one has to be willing to 
recognize antisemitism and to fight against it. 
Socialists, republicans, democrats, and liberals 
may not be altogether pleased about this. There 
was some significant feeling on the French left 
at the time of Dreyfus that this was a fight 
between two privileged groups of army officers, 
the old aristocracy and the nouveau riche and 
cosmopolitan “finance capital” class, which had 
little to do with the genuinely oppressed. 
There is sometimes a reluctance in oppos-
ing antisemitism because it looks like siding 
with the Jews; and there is always somebody 
who seems more deserving. Today one sees, 
for example, a suspicion that anybody who 
researches or teaches about the Holocaust is 
privileging that over other more deserving cases 
for some ulterior motive. One sees the claim 
that the Holocaust is only acknowledged as evil 
because the victims were “white,” and that when 
white people murdered nonwhites around the 
world, nobody cared. Reasons to play down the 
importance of antisemitism, and to cast those 
who don’t as vulgar and tribal, are abundant. 
Today people are tempted by an analyti-
cal splitting of the world into the people of 
nowhere and the people of somewhere, the cos-
mopolitans and the “white working class.” the 
liberal metropolitan elite and the “left behinds.” 
Notwithstanding the fact that the working class 
is not white: it is diverse. But whiteness itself, 
in the context of the “white working class,” 
has also come to be used as a sign of oppres-
sion. And then, in another reversal, racism 
and antisemitism comes to be seen as the cry 
of the oppressed rather than as oppressive 
power structures. A feeling lurks that Jews who 
demand that everybody opposes antisemitism 
are really demanding some kind of special priv-
ilege for themselves; and that the metropolitan 
liberals who insist on political correctness and 
antiracism are really creating rhetorical struc-
tures to keep the oppressed quiet and obedient. 
The Holocaust is sometimes reconfigured 
as an attempt, in fact a conspiracy, to bolster 
Jewish power; or as a Eurocentric overconcern 
with atrocities by white people on white people. 
Here again, the Holocaust is no longer itself, but 
it becomes the Holocaust affair, a discourse man-
ufactured, weaponized, exaggerated, controlled, 
by “the Jews.” Holocaust Memorial Day becomes 
an opportunity for antisemitic discourse about 
Israel, the boxing in of actual Jews who are 
accused of supporting oppression, by the invoca-
tion of “the Jews” who are sanctified as absolute 
victims.
Today we live in an era when conspiracy fan-
tasy is more and more attractive in mainstream 
political culture and in apparently diverse and 
distinct forms. Whether all our problems are 
David Hirsh
58 Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism
imagined to be caused by the European Union 
or by the Zionists, by the globalists or by the 
finance capitalists, antidemocratic thinking is 
still attracted to antisemitism. And were not 
the persecutors of Alfred Dreyfus also great pio-
neers of “fake news”? And do not all conspiracy 
fantasists require ways of ignoring inconvenient 
facts and evidence which threaten to anchor 
them to material reality?
This piece by the much missed Robert 
Wistrich is worth reading. It is worth read-
ing to understand what happened to Alfred 
Dreyfus; and to understand how the Dreyfus 
affair came to dominate France; and to under-
stand French antisemitism; and to understand 
how it was one origin of twentieth-century 
totalitarianism; and to understand something 
about the present.
Synopsis
We are pleased to publish one of the last 
pieces that Robert Wistrich wrote, which is on 
Antisemitism in France at the time of Alfred 
Dreyfus. It is published with an introductory 
essay by David Hirsh which looks at how the 
issues Wistrich highlights around the Dreyfus 
affair may be read in the contemporary context 
of the re-emergence of antisemitism and popu-
lism into mainstream discourse. 
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